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EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
AND COMMERCIAL BRIBERY CONSIDERATIONS
James G. Park*
Historically, the United States has sought to impose
its moralistic values extraterritorially. Our antitrust
laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are two well-
known examples. Thus, in making the determination to en-
gage in investment in the United States, a foreign entity
must consider not only the more publicized restrictions of
the Sherman Act 2 and the Clayton Act 3 on its activity with-
in the borders of this country, but also must be concerned
with the extraterritorial impact of the United States'
antitrust laws and the extent to which the decision to in-
vest in the United States may create exposure under United
States antitrust laws with respect to other operations
of the foreign investor conducted in other countries.
A foreign investor in the United States must also be
aware of various restrictions placed on all companies
soliciting business in the United States. A perfectly ac-
ceptable and customary practice abroad may here be held to
be commercial bribery or the grant of an illegal commission.
I. Extraterritorial Impact of United States Antitrust Laws
Let us first examine the extraterritorial impact of
* A.B. Dickinson College, 1952; J.D. Dickinson School of
Law, 1954; Partner, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle &
Buerger, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA. The writer acknowledges the
valuable assistance provided by Robert W. Brown, Esq. in the
preparation of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78o, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
United States antitrust laws and then the jurisdictional
problems presented by the presence in this country of a
subsidiary of a foreign corporation.
The substantive reach of the Sherman Act has not been
altered since its passage in 1890. The statute condemns
all conspiracies to restrain, or attempt to monopolize,
trade among the several states of the United States or
United States trade with foreign nations.
Although there have been no fundamental changes in the
Sherman Act itself, there have been important interpretive
shifts regarding its application to extraterritorial conduct.
At first it appeared that the antitrust laws had no extra-
territorial effect. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
4
Co., the Supreme Court considered a complaint by the de-
funct American Banana Company that the United Fruit Com-
pany had driven it out of business in Costa Rica by induc-
ing the government there to expropriate its land, send
troops across its property and cut its railroad connections
to the sea. In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the
Court held that the complaint was not cognizable in United
States courts because the relevant events occurred in a
foreign country and also because the alleged acts were
sovereign acts of state.
Although American Banana remains a viable precedent
with regard to the "act of state" doctrine, the statement
to the effect that antitrust laws have no extraterritorial
effect is no longer a correct statement of law. A number
of cases establish that conduct outside the United States
is encompassed by our antitrust laws if that conduct has an
effect on United States commerce. While the precise stand-
ard to be applied remains unclear, it appears that an
4. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
expansive interpretation will be applied and a significant
percentage of the conduct challenged will be held to be
within the scope of the American antitrust laws.
The courts are not in agreement on the degree of ef-
fect on United States foreign commerce which is required
to trigger application of the antitrust laws. Reference
5
is made to "direct and material effect", "substantial im-
pact" 6 and "any effect that is not both insubstantial and
indirect." 7 Additionally, conduct overseas must involve
both an intent to affect American commerce and an actual
effect thereon. In 1945 the Second Circuit ruled in United
8
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) that a cartel
scheme entirely among foreign firms and occurring entirely
in Europe would fall within the coverage of the Sherman Act
if the scheme's intended and actual effect was to restrain
the trade of the United States.
That portion of the Alcoa ruling was, however, dicta
as the foreign cartel members were not named as defendants
in the case. The Alcoa approach has received mixed reviews.
The majority interpretation appears to be that presented by
the International Law Association in 1972 which stated that
a state has a right to punish foreign conduct when either a
significant constituent element of the offense takes place
in its territory or the foreign conduct produces substan-
tial reprehensible effects on its territory that occur as a
direct and primarily intended result. The I.L.A. stressed,
5. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied,
407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922
(1969).
6. Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635, 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.,
331 F. Supp. 92, 103 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
8. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
however, that if other states had concurrent jurisdiction
over the conduct, each state should, in applying its own
law to the conduct in other states, "pay due respect to the
major interests and economic policies of such other states."
9
A factual situation involving solely foreign conspira-
tors with no overt acts on United States soil has not been
litigated since Alcoa in 1945. But in 1962, the Supreme
Court modified the American Banana territorial rule in
10
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., in-
volving a United States-Canadian vandium monopolization at-
tempt. The Court held:
A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic
or foreign commerce of the United States is not out-
side the reach of the Sherman Act just because part
of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign
countries.11
Starting with the decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Amrc,12
Bank of America, a trend has emerged to the effect that
the exercise of national jurisdiction as to extraterritorial
acts also subject to foreign law should be tempered by
comity. This is in keeping with the recommendation of the
International Law Association that restraint in such cir-
cumstances be imposed by either: (1) a conflict of laws
approach as to jurisdiction, based on a weighing and bal-
ancing of relative United States and foreign interests; or
(2) a type of limited abstention based on diplomatic sug-
gestions and considerations. The law here, however, re-
mains in a state of flux.
9. See Hunter, Some Progress Toward the Avoidance and
Resolution of Conflicts Between the Anti-Trust Laws of
Different Countries, in Papers and Reports of the Tokyo
International Conference on International Economy and
Competition Policy 235 (1973).
10. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
11. Id. at 704.
12. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
In Timberlane Lumber, the Ninth Circuit ruled on the
issue of whether United States jurisdiction existed over an
alleged conspiracy primarily involving foreclosure of a
lien in the courts of Honduras. A denial of jurisdiction
was overruled on remand for further consideration on the
grounds that the alleged conspiracy apparently prevented
export of lumber to America (and thereby creating the req-
uisite effect on commerce) and because the matter did not
"challenge Honduran policy or sovereignty in any fashion
that appears on its face to hold any threat to the relations
between Honduras and the United States."
1 3 
The lower court
was directed to be aware of the foreign policy implications
of cases involving extraterritorial issues, especially in
private suits where "there is no opportunity for the execu-
tive branch to weigh the foreign relations impact .... ,14
The opinion in Timberlane Lumber stated that the "ef-
fects" test formulated in Alcoa was inadequate unless bal-
anced within a "jurisdictional rule of reason."
1 5 
The
court suggested that the elements to be weighed should in-
clude:
)T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
the nationality or allegiance of the parties,
the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere. .......
the explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce . . . and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad.
1 6
The Timberlane Lumber approach was cited favorably by
the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
13. Id. at 549 F.2d at 608.
14. Id. at 613.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 614 (footnote omitted).
Corp. 1 7 Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Mannington Mills, the
Third Circuit interpreted the issue as a question of ab-
stention or comity rather than an issue of jurisdiction.
In Mannington Mills an American floor covering manufacturer
sued an American competitor for monopolization. The plain-
tiff claimed that the defendant blocked United States com-
petitors from export or direct foreign competition by
fraudulently obtaining patents in twenty-six foreign na-
tions. The trial court was held to have erred in deciding
the matter on the basis of an act of state defense. The
case was remanded for application of a balancing test to
determine if subject matter jurisdiction should be exercised.
The opinion lists ten factors to be considered in comparing
United States and foreign interests:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation
of conduct compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the
pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American
commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the
court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
7. If the relief is granted, whether a party
will be placed in a position of being forced
to perform an act illegal in either country
or by under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable
in this country if made by the foreign nation
under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has
addressed the issue.
1 8
17. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
18. Id. at 1297-8 (footnote omitted).
The balancing test concept is mentioned in a few other
recent cases but in none of these did the balance result in
an immediate dismissal or restriction of the litigation.
The courts recognize that the balancing test usually re-
quires more facts than can be gleaned from the pleadings.
Hence, there must either be a "mini-trial" of the juris-
dictional issue, or the motions to dismiss must be held
in abeyance until the completion of the trial. In the case
19
of In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the ruling of a district court judge to the
effect that foreign defendants who declined to appear in
court were not entitled to argue the merits of the bal-
ancing test for jurisdiction. The court also refused to
give weight to balancing test arguments offered in amicus
curiae briefs filed by the home governments of the non-
appearing defendants.
The Seventh Circuit, by stating that the comparative
relations test employed in Mannington Mills (which essen-
tially restates the Timberlane Lumber test) provides an
"adequate framework"
2 0 
for determining whether to abstain
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction, seems to im-
ply that it accepted the reasoning, if not the exact test,
of Mannington Mills. The district court focused on three
factors, including the possible unfairness to the plain-
tiff should adjudication be delayed, the seriousness of
the charges and the fact that the recalcitrance of the non-
answering parties could necessitate use of strong sanctions.
Nevertheless, it appears that the district court's
analysis fails to deal adequately with the possible effects
19. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at f255.
on foreign relations that the exercise of jurisdiction
might have. The claim that the approach of the district
court was functionally equivalent to that of Mannington
Mills is not valid. The fact that the defendants contested
the existence of United States jurisdiction by not appear-
ing, and the fact that the claim was raised by their gov-
ernments appearing as amici curiae, indicates foreign
opposition to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
by American courts. Thus, a court sensitive to notions of
international comity might have found it inappropriate in
this case to exercise jurisdiction. In a sense, In re
Uranium Antitrust Litigation indicates a retreat from a
"jurisdictional rule of reason."
The Departments of State and Justice have indicated
their support for amicus participation in antitrust suits
filed in this country. To date, however, the position
taken has not had a perceptible impact. Nevertheless, con-
cern with the extent of the extraterritorial reach of the
United States' antitrust law should continue.
Let us now examine the jurisdictional problems pre-
sented by the presence in this country of a subsidiary of
a foreign company.
United States law establishes a clear distinction be-
tween the issues of jurisdiction over the offence and juris-
diction over persons or parties. As a general rule, if the
offence would not adversely effect United States commerce,
existence of jurisdiction over the parties is not relevant.
Conversely, if the offence is cognizable under United States
antitrust law, but the defendants are not subject to service
of process, no action can take place, at least in a civil
21
case. There is precedent in criminal cases, including
criminal antitrust cases, for indicting foreign persons
who can be subjected to trial should they ever enter the
jurisdiction. In United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Com-
22
binatie Voor Chemische Industrie, a defendant was ar-
rested six years after indictment for participation in a
quinine cartel when he stopped in New York and attempted
to change planes. American courts uphold service of pro-
cess by mail on natural persons or corporations who previ-
ously did business in the United States and took part in
an antitrust offence directly or through an agent such as
a corporate subsidiary.
2 3
The exposure of the conduct of a foreign parent cor-
poration as the result of the presence of a wholly owned
American subsidiary. is an issue that, while touched upon,
is not yet resolved. In Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota
24
Motor Corp., the court held that where an American sub-
sidiary doing business in the United States was the agent
of the foreign (Japanese) parent corporation (as deter-
mined by applicable state law) the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Clayton Act were satisfied for purposes of a
suit against the foreign parent in federal district court.
The promotion, sale and service of the product manufactured
by the foreign parent was held to be sufficiently "continu-
ing and substantial" 2 5 to justify jurisdiction over the
21. See United States v. De Beers Consolidated Mines,
Ltd., 1944-45 Trade Cas. (CCH) § 57,354 (1945), rev'd,
325 U.S. 212 (1945).
22. [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
690, at A-6 (Nov. 26, 1974).
23. See In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
24. 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
25. Id. at 531.
foreign parent.
26
But in Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., the
court held that, in the absence of an agency relationship,
the "doing businsss" test does not subject a foreign sub-
sidiary to personal jurisdiction simply because there ex-
isted jurisdiction over the parent, even where the parent
is the lone shareholder of the subsidiary. The court indi-
cated that personal jurisdiction also exists where control
of the subsidiary by the parent is so complete that the
subsidiary is, in reality, a mere department of the parent.
In a footnote to Saraceno, the court further indicated
that the same analysis would apply regardless of whether it
was the parent or the subsidiary that was the domestic
entity.
2 7
The most recent decision to address the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an anti-
trust suit is Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co.,
28
Ltd. The court applied the state law jurisdictional
standards of in personam jurisdiction. The operative re-
quirement in that determination was whether the foreign
parent could be held to be "doing business" in the forum.
The court held that the parent-subsidiary relationship does
not, in itself, constitute sufficient grounds to establish
personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent, and that
further inquiry must be made, including factors such as
the direct or indirect control over the local subsidiary,
and the treatment of the subsidiary as an incorporated
26. 83 F.D.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
27. Id. at 67 n.5, citing with approval, Titu-Serban
Ionescu v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 434 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
division or as an agent of the parent. The decision indi-
cates that the parent corporation will be deemed present in
the forum for purposes of jurisdiction where the relation-
ship between the foreign parent and the local subsidiary
gives rise to a valid inference of an agency relationship,
considering in addition to control, the type and range of
the products sold by the subsidiary, the age of the sub-
sidiary and the extent to which the subsidiary developed
independently of the parent.
Applying the law to the facts of Bulova, the court
held that personal jurisdiction did indeed exist. The
determination was based on (1) the parent's penetration of
the American market by the use of subsidiaries to market a
single product manufactured by the parent; (2) the parent
continued to engage in market penetration and expansion;
(3) the American market was too important to the parent's
welfare to use independent and uncontrolled sales agents
and distributors; (4) almost the entire American sales of
the parent's production moved through subsidiaries; (5)
the export market was crucial to the parent and the sub-
sidiaries were the means by which the parent had establish-
ed and sought to maintain its base; (6) the subsidiaries
did for the parent everything the parent would have done
were it operating in the jurisdiction; and (7) the cause
of action was integrally related to the doing of business
within the jurisdiction.
Another list enumerating factors to be considered in
determining the existence of personal jurisdiction was set
forth in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., Inc. 2 9 The court stated:
29. 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
From these cases, some involving venue, other
jurisdiction, emerges a comprehensive set of
factors which a court should examine in order
to determine whether a corporation, though
superficially absent from a district, is in
fact transacting business there through a
subsidiary or affiliated corporation.30
The court then listed the following as some of the
factors to be considered:
1. [T]he performance by the subsidiary or affil-
iate of business activities in a district,
for example sales and services, that in a
less absent corporation would perform
directly by its own branch offices or agents.
2. [A] partnership in world-wide business com-
petition between the absent corporation and
the corporation that is present in the
district.
3. [T]he capacity of the absent corporation to
influence decisions of the subsidiary or
affiliate that might have antitrust con-
sequences. Controlling stock ownership and
interlocking directorates are, of course,
indices of such capacity.
4. [TIhe part that the subsidiary or affiliated
corporation plays in the over-all activity of
the absent corporation.
5. [T]he existence of an integrated sales system
involving manufacturing, trading and sales
corporations.
6. A related factor is the status of the sub-
sidiary or affiliate as a marketing arm of
the absent corporation.
7. [T]he use by the subsidiary or affiliate of
a trademark owned by the parent.
8. The transfer of personnel back and forth
between the absent corporation and its sub-
sidiary or affiliate.
9. [T]he presentation of a common marketing
image by the related corporations . . ..
This is especially true when those corpora-
tions hold themselves out to the public
as a single entity that is conveniently
departmentalized either nationally or world-
wide.
30. Id. at 327.
10. [T]he granting of an exclusive distributor-
ship by the absent corporation to its sub-
sidiary or affiliate.
3 1
Several foreign commentators suggest that the United
States could avoid much diplomatic irritation if it applied
its antitrust laws to the foreign conduct of Americans but
32
not to that of foreigners. The contrary view maintains
that to base jurisdictions and standards of behavior on
nationality is inappropriate in antitrust as it encourages
33
chauvinism and discrimination. Also, since foreigners
victimized by violations of American antitrust laws may
have the right to sue for damages and injunctive relief, it
would be anomalous to allow them the benefits of the law
without their being subject to it.
The Justice Department recognizes that criminal sanc-
tions against individuals should turn on their knowing
violation of United States law, with a slight presumption
that foreign nationals may lack such knowledge and intent.
Foreign individuals rarely are named as defendants. Few,
if any, are sentenced to a prison term, though many Ameri-
can individuals have received jail sentences. Also, the
decision by the Antitrust Division to name only a United
States firm as a defendant in the uranium cartel criminal
34
case may indicate a decision to allow foreign firms some-
what more leeway in cooperating with foreign governmental
policies that would be acceptable to American firms. Thus,
there seems to be some flexibility and prosecutorial
31. Id. at 327-8 (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., A. Neale & D. Goyder, The Antitrust Laws
the U.S.A. 369-71 (3d ed. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Kintner & Joelson, An International
Antitrust Primer 26 (1974).
34. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248
(7th Cir. 1980).
discretion in deciding how to treat foreign firms and in-
dividuals under United States law, but it does not seem at
all likely that any general policy of applying the law
only to United States firms and individuals will be adopted.
What does all this mean to persons who will be advis-
ing or counselling with foreign entities seeking to invest
or to do business in the United States and to foreign busi-
nessmen 'who must make the decision to engage in business
here? I suggest the following for your consideration:
1. The foreign businessman and his foreign
counsel should be made aware of the
basic principles of United States anti-
trust laws. Without a working knowledge
of these principles, they will not be able
to evaluate the risks, not only as to the
domestic operation of his business here,
but also as to any possible extraterri-
torial effect of the antitrust laws on his
foreign operations.
2. A free exchange should be encouraged re-
garding the foreign operations so that the
United States counsel may participate in
the process of risk evaluation.
3. The domestic subsidiary should be structured
with reference to the factors set forth in
Bulova and Zenith.
It must be understood, however, that the law is far
from clear, and changing interpretations by the courts and
changing policies of the executive branch will have to be
monitored closely in the future.
II. Conduct Prohibited As Commercial Bribery Or By The
Robinson-Patman Act
In 1977 Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices
35
Act. The principal purpose of the Act is to prevent the
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78o, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff
(Supp. IV 1980).
practice of bribery overseas by United States business con-
cerns. If the objective is to eliminate bribery throughout
the world regardless of the identity of the perpetrator,
it must be realized that the Act cannot, in and of itself,
achieve that objective, and it apparently does not even
set a model which other developed countries are anxious to
reproduce. The United States is the only country in the
world which makes bribery outside its jurisdiction by an
entity incorporated within its jurisdiction a criminal of-
fence within its jurisdiction.
Foreign entities seeking to invest in the United States,
while not restricted at home by regulations similar to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, must nevertheless be aware
of the United States laws with respect to commercial brib-
ery. Conduct perfectly acceptable and customary in the
foreign businessman's country or in foreign countries in
which he does business may subject him and his United States
friends to great embarrassment and possible criminal charges.
Commercial bribery has been defined as the offence of
bribery by an employee, servant, or agent, with the intent
to influence him in his relation to his employer, master,
36
or principal. The gravamen of the offence of commercial
bribery is the attempt to bribe. The attempt need not be
successful nor is it necessary that money actually be
tendered. Commercial bribery is a creature of state law
and applicable state statutes should be consulted.
3 8
The federal and state statutes which outlaw commercial
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (Supp. IV 1980).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 4108, 4701
(Purdon 1972).
bribery do not distinguish the point at which the entertain-
ing of an employee for the purpose of creating a favorable
business climate ends and the crime of commercial bribery
begins. The "Travel Act" 3 9 prohibits use of interstate
commerce to violate federal bribery statutes or the bribery
statute of the state in which the bribe occurred. The "RICO
40
Act", prohibits bribery that is chargeable under state
laws and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Other federal statutes prohibit the bribery of public of-
41
ficials, use of National Bank money to bribe state of-
42
ficials, and acceptance of gifts or money by an internal
revenue agent or officer for the compromise, adjustment or
settlement of any charge or complaint.
4 3
Few cases have addressed the matter of defining acts
which will constitute commercial bribery. Those which do
are applications of state law and hence turn on the inter-
pretation of the particular statute involved. These state
statutes vary so significantly as to make more than the
grossest generalizations impractical.
44
In United States v. L'Hoste, tacit recognition was
made of the legitimacy of "goodwill expenditures" and
customer entertainment practices routinely provided in the
private business world. The defendant's attempt to equate
its payments to a public official with such customer enter-
tainment practices and thereby remove its conduct from the
scope of the Louisiana bribery statute was rebuffed by the
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 7214(9) (1976).
44. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
833 (1980).
court. In making its ruling the court distinguished be-
tween "goodwill expenditures" made to or on behalf of
public officials and those made to potential customers.
While customer entertainment practices on the order of
those discussed in L'Hoste are not held to constitute com-
mercial bribery, care must be taken in this area. It is
45
unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission Act, for a
price, reward, gift, or favor to be bestowed or promised
by a seller for the express purpose of influencing the
action of its own customers or prospective customers, or
its competitor's customers or prospective customers.
The FTC applies the term "commercial bribery" to the practice
of sellers secretly paying money or making gifts to em-
ployees or agents to induce them to promote purchases by
their own enployees from the sellers offering the secret
inducements. The vice of conduct labeled "commercial
bribery" by the FTC as related to unfair trade practices.
is the advantage which one competitor secures over his fel-
low competitors by his secret or corrupt dealings with em-
ployees or agents of prospective purchasers.
4 6
Commercial bribery is also punishable under the Travel
Act.
4 7 
While it is contended that the Act was meant to ap-
ply solely to public officials, it appears that commercial
bribery generally is within the purview of the Act. The
Fifth Circuit expressly rejected an attempt to limit the
reach of the Travel Act to bribery of public officials.
4 8
Bribery of private employees, if prohibited by state law,
45. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
46. See American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co.,
104 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1939).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
48. United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
falls within the meaning of bribery as used in the Travel
Act.
4 9
Thus, while certain "goodwill expenditures" are clear-
ly permissible, acquisition of an advantage by a competitor
by use of secret and corrupt dealings with employees or
agents of prospective purchasers is not allowed. The dis-
tinction between these two categories remains hazy and will,
to a large extent, be a creature of state law. The un-
answered question is, "How much is too much?"
Section 13(c) of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimina-
tion Act 5 0 also touches on the area. Section 13(c) reads
as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to
pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything
of value as a commission, brokerage, or other
compensation, or any allowance or discount in
lieu thereof, except for services rendered in
connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares, or merchandise, either to the other
party to such transaction or to an agent, re-
presentative, or other intermediary therein
where such intermediary is acting in fact for
or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or
indirect control, of any party to whom such
compensation is so granted or paid.
5 1
One of the purposes of the section is to protect the
integrity of the principal-agent relationship where a viola-
tion has an anti-competitive effect. 5 2  Section 13(c) of the
Act was held to reach commercial bribery cases.5 3  That con-
clusion was based on the reasoning that commercial bribery
constituted indirect price discrimination. Additionally,
49. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
52. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976); Modern Marketing Service, Inc.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
53. See Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.
1976); Ragen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1975).
where an employee of one party to a sales transaction ac-
cepts a bribe from the other party to the transaction to
induce his employer to behave in a way favorable to the
payer of the bribe, such a payment can constitute a viola-
tion of section 13(c).
Whether certain conduct indeed will constitute a
violation of section 13(c) is a question of fact.
5 4 
The
language of 13(c) does, however, except payments made in
return for services rendered. There is a split of author-
ity. Some courts have held that the exception merely pre-
serves the right of one party to a transaction to pay his
own agents for services rendered, but does not justify
payment to the other party's agent even if they do render
services to the person making the payments.
5 5 
In contrast,
it has also been held that the "services rendered" excep-
tion can justify the payment by one party to a sales
transaction to the other party to the transaction or the
other party's agent provided that it can be shown that the
person receiving the payment did indeed render services to
the person making the payment.
5 6 
In any event, care must
be exercised in any decision involving payments to em-
ployees of competitors, customers or potential customers.
The important point here is that foreign business-
men must be warned that a good faith expression of friend-
ship or appreciation, perfectly acceptable abroad, may be
interpreted here as an attempt to secure an advantage, thus
54. Cf. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman &
Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Fuchs Sugars
& Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 447 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), rev'd, 602 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979).
55. Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Freedman v. Philadelphia
Terminals Auction Co., 145 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
56. Ragen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1965).
destroying the very business climate that the unwary
businessman sought to promote.
